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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Evolution of the Modern Corporate Structure has been one of 
the most influential chapters of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.1 But a limit of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’s influ-
ential analysis is that it is framed in the American context and cannot be 
easily generalized to other experiences. Their corporate model arose in a 
democratic country where “production engineers”2 commanded more 
respect than financiers and capitalist dynasties. Other countries evolved 
along different organizational paths. Different institutional complementa-
rities between labor and financial markets generated “concentrated 
equilibria” different from the American “dispersed equilibrium.” This 
Article argues that the roots of this divide can be found in the different 
aristocratic and democratic origins of the two systems, and that organiza-
tional biodiversity is still an important feature of the global economy. 
The work of Berle and Means included a careful study of the evolu-
tion occurring in the United States during the interwar period.3 Berle and 
Means described how the corporation evolved as a product of decentrali-
zation of powers formerly monopolized by the states.4 Similar processes 
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1967) (1932). 
 2. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 69 (1921) (“These [highly 
trained and specially gifted experts], technologists, engineers, or whatever name may best suit them, 
make up the indispensible General Staff of the industrial system; and without their immediate and 
unremitting guidance and correction the industrial system will not work. It is a mechanically orga-
nized structure of technical processes designed, installed and conducted by these production engi-
neers.”). 
 3. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
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were at work in other countries as well, and Berle and Means’s analysis 
could be seen as a useful guide for the general evolution of capitalism.5 
But the advent of the new organizational species, which was to become 
known as the “Berle and Means Public Company,” required a complex 
political process. Thus, the asymmetric political conditions of different 
countries were bound to have a strong influence on its institutional struc-
ture.6 
As argued by Mark J. Roe, different political conditions, such as 
social democracy, cause important impacts on corporate-governance sys-
tems.7 Conversely, different corporate-governance systems can generate 
different political reactions.8 On one hand, social democracy can be seen 
as a set of political conditions impeding the separation between owner-
ship and control and the development of the public company.9 On the 
other hand, social democracy can also be seen as a reaction to a concen-
trated family-based corporate-governance system.10 M. Belloc and I have 
shown that causation runs both ways: from politics to corporate govern-
ance and vice versa.11 
Politics and corporate governance co-evolve. Initial conditions in 
history can have a decisive role in shaping a process of cumulative cau-
sation—where the political conditions existing when “big business” 
emerged in a country play a decisive role in the structure of its future 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD: CIVILIZATION AND 
CAPITALISM 15TH–18TH CENTURY (Harper & Row 1984) (1979); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL 
ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (1966); A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS (Randall K. Morck 
ed., 2005) [hereinafter HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. 
 6. For an ample overview of the corporate-governance systems of different countries, see the 
essays contained in HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5. Corporate systems with 
concentrated ownership are considered in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2000). Lon Fuller pointed out how the firm involves a decentralization of a public order-
ing into a private ordering where some transactions are centralized—a point that is particularly evi-
dent in the case of the modern corporation. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969); 
see also Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 253–67. I previ-
ously integrated Fuller’s approach with the Coasian approach using the Cathedral framework, which 
was developed by G. Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. Ugo Pagano, Marrying in the Cathedral: 
A Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 264–89 (Alessio M. Paccesed ed., 2010) (citing Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)). 
 7. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 1–3 (2003). 
 8. See id. at 112–13. 
 9. Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, Politics–Business Interaction Paths 5–6 (CESifo, Working 
Paper No. 2883, June 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623 
774. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 19–20. 
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institutions of production.12 Berle and Means considered the evolution of 
the corporation in a special framework where, at the time of the second 
Industrial Revolution, a robust democracy already existed.13 The demo-
cratic roots of the American system of corporate governance are 
unique14 (with the possible exception of Switzerland).15 In our times, the 
uniqueness of the American experience is hidden by its dominant role in 
the world economy.16 American dominance has turned an exceptional 
pattern into an apparent norm that other countries are supposed to fol-
low.17 
If a robust democratic system had already developed by the time of 
the emergence of large enterprises, then the concentration of economic 
power in the wealthy would likely have been challenged and limited by 
democratic political action.18 But the power of the labor unions was often 
limited by political constraints put in place by those acting in the inter-
ests of employers.19 In the United States, trade unions turned out to be 
less popular and powerful than in most other capitalist countries.20 As a 
result of these political constraints, neither the employers nor the workers 
had to balance the concentration of power of the other side. This was a 
case of a “dispersed equilibrium”—where neither workers nor owners 
fully organized because a democratic state was in charge and able to lim-
it the power of other centralized organizations. These democratic roots 
marked the particular setting where the Berle and Means Public Compa-
ny emerged. 
                                                 
 12. See id. 
 13. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM 47–49 (1990). See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 14. Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance: An In-
troduction, in HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 1–2. Marco Becht and J. 
Bradford DeLong introduced their interesting paper by considering the two (related) sources of 
American exceptionalism: “A century ago European academics like Werner Sombart worried why 
the United States was exceptional, in that it had no socialism. Today we academics worry about a 
different form of American exceptionalism: why is there so little block holding in the United 
States?” Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong, Why has There Been So Little Block Holding in Amer-
ica?, in HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 613. 
 15. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
 16. See Becht & DeLong, supra note 14, at 621–22. 
 17. See id. 
 18. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 26–29 (1994). 
 19. See., e.g., IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER 1933–1941 (1969); ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN 
AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978); WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING AMERICA: THE RISE 
OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997). 
 20. See Morton Keller, Regulation of Large Enterprise, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES 161, 
170–74 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Darms eds., 1980). 
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Most countries have had different evolutionary paths. If a robust 
democratic system had not emerged before the development of the large 
capitalist enterprises, then the unchecked, concentrated power of the cap-
italist dynasties would go well beyond their private wealth.21 In that case, 
union and social-democratic power would likely arise as a counterbal-
ance and later be an important ingredient in the democratization of socie-
ty. The result of that process would be that both workers and employers 
could find justification for the concentration of their own interests in the 
high degree of concentration of the other’s interests, generating a fairly 
stable, concentrated equilibrium. 
Concentrated equilibria are likely to have aristocratic roots22 in the 
sense that the existence of dynastic privileges and social exclusion also 
favor a concentration of workers’ interests. Because dynastic and aristo-
cratic privileges were still widespread outside of the United States at the 
time of the second Industrial Revolution,23 it is not surprising that a pat-
tern different from the one illustrated by Berle and Means was followed 
by other capitalist countries. 
The Berle and Means Public Companies theory, which built upon 
Veblen’s works on the corporate model, offers a popular counter-
narrative to today’s history-silent neoclassical approach to understanding 
corporate governance. Its strength lies in applying the Darwinian evolu-
tionary construct to the development of modern institutions with a focus 
on the American context. But its limitations are twofold. First, it assumes 
that the singular American example is sufficient to determine a pattern 
that can then be applied as a roadmap to other regions. Second, it ignores 
the critical role of biodiversity to the Darwinian construct, and therefore 
fails to apply that part of the evolutionary equation to institutions. 
This Article builds upon the Berle and Means Public Companies 
theory by deconstructing these two limitations. It considers the evolu-
tionary paths of several well-documented European systems, and then 
compares and contrasts the effects of their aristocratic roots to the very 
different democratic roots present in America. Finally, it argues that “or-
ganizational biodiversity” is an important feature of the global economy, 
just as actual biodiversity is a critical feature of natural ecologies. 
Part II of this Article examines how each type of equilibrium forms 
in response to different political environments and influences the actors 
within it. Part III discusses the two types of political roots from which 
modern corporate governance grows: aristocratic roots and democratic 
                                                 
 21. See MOORE, supra note 5, at 20–22. 
 22. In Part IV, I show that there has been a considerable variety of aristocratic political and 
social roots. 
 23. See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 13; MOORE, supra note 5. 
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roots. Part III also examines examples of corporations modeling them-
selves after the operating governmental structures and demonstrates that 
the corporate structures are influenced significantly by their political en-
vironments. 
Part IV explores how aristocratic roots grow different types of 
equilibria, expounding on the rich diversity that the aristocratic roots in 
Europe have produced compared to the unique case of democratic roots 
in America. Part V counters the assertion that a single Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance exists between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and demonstrates that their similarities grow instead 
from different roots and that their differences are actually significant. In 
addition, Part V discusses how corporate and governmental structures 
can exert coevolutionary pressures on each other. Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses the relationship between labor and financial markets. 
II. SAFEGUARDS FOR SPECIFICITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
In this Part, I discuss the pressure driving equilibrium by analyzing 
the risks and opportunities available to three key types of actors within 
the economic system: owners, managers, and workers. Furthermore, I 
consider how different political environments can influence how equilib-
rium is reached. 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Oliver Williamson observed that 
labor and financial markets share an important characteristic distinguish-
ing them from intermediate-product markets: in both cases, the individu-
als make specific investments and, at the same time, face a collective 
action problem.24 
Information asymmetries characterize both cases. But according to 
Williamson, the asymmetric-information problem is more serious in the 
case of the relationship between shareholders and directors because the 
latter can easily collude with top management.25 The integrity of deci-
sion-making delegation—the most remarkable advantage of the public 
company—would be lost if shareholders have to rebalance information 
asymmetries in a way similar to that characterizing the relationship be-
tween the workers and their representatives. Thus, according to William-
son, shareholder democracy can easily degenerate into oligarchy26—a 
                                                 
 24. Oliver Williamson, Speech at the Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Govern-
ance International Economic Association (IEA) Research Workshop: Corporate Governance and 
Managerial Discretion Revisited—The Lens of Contract/Governance Perspective (July 12, 2006). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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point that was forcefully made in Berle and Means’s path-breaking con-
tribution.27 
The difference between the collective action problems faced by 
workers and shareholders is related to the inseparability between human 
capital and its owner, which has no counterpart in the case of nonhuman 
capital. Because of this inseparability, the problem of “absentee owner-
ship” is obviously less severe in the case of human capital. Even the most 
absent-minded individuals cannot be really absent when their human 
capital is being used by others! Unsurprisingly, information asymmetries 
between workers and union leaders are less severe than those occurring 
between shareholders and directors. 
Besides the impossibility of absentee ownership, the human capital 
of an individual is also characterized by the fact that others cannot own 
it. For this reason, the ownership of human capital is also characterized 
by two other restrictions. On one hand, all the human capital of an indi-
vidual must be concentrated in the hands of that individual. On the other 
hand, the ownership of different individuals must be dispersed among 
them. The ownership of shares is therefore potentially more concentrated 
or dispersed than that of human capital. One does not need to own all the 
shares of a firm in the same way one owns all the shares of his or her 
human capital. At the same time, one can be the owner of shares of dif-
ferent firms, whereas in modern societies, it is impossible to own per-
centages of other human beings. 
If we focus our attention only on the concentration of our human 
capital in one person and the possible dispersion of shares among many 
individuals, we reach Williamson’s conclusion: the collective action of 
the shareholders is harder to overcome than the collective-action problem 
of the workers.28 
But the opposite may also be true. The ownership of capital is not 
necessarily dispersed; it can be more concentrated than that of labor. 
From this point of view, shareholders can overcome their collective-
action problem more easily than workers. There are many ways in which 
owners can concentrate their ability to control capital well beyond what 
would be allowed by their personal wealth. One of them has recently at-
tracted much attention in the literature: the possibility of building wealth 
through pyramids—structures developed when a firm controls several 
companies that in turn own several more.29 
                                                 
 27. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 83. 
 28. Williamson, supra note 24. 
 29. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and 
Growth, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 655, 657 (2005). 
2012] The Evolution of the American Corporation 1277 
Specific assets need to be safeguarded against the possible oppor-
tunism of the owners of other assets. Unlike general purpose assets, spe-
cific assets cannot easily find alternative employment if they happen to 
be treated unfairly in their present positions. 
Within certain limits, there may be no tradeoffs between employ-
ers’ and workers’ safeguards. For instance, some degree of job security 
may enhance workers’ welfare, productivity, and firm value. Both types 
of safeguards can contribute to high levels of investment and efficiency. 
But after a certain limit, a tradeoff among these safeguards will exist. 
Moreover, in many cases, the safeguards that are necessary to protect the 
investments of one group of individuals will depend on the level of safe-
guards that are achieved by the others. Weak or robust safeguards for 
both capital and labor may be the key ingredients of two self-sustaining 
equilibria analogous to the high- and low-armament equilibria arising in 
a standard arms-race game.30 
Also, nonowning managers need safeguards for their specific in-
vestments in human capital. Managers are often required to make “se-
cond-order” specific investments to govern the relations arising from the 
specific investments of other agents.31 In the case of these specific in-
vestments, the general purpose rules and enforcement that govern public 
markets may be inadequate. Managers are required to set up and rule pri-
vate orderings that are designed to deal with these specific investments. 
In turn, their own skills acquire a “second-order specificity” to deal with 
the specific relations that they structure and run. Thus, managers may 
require safeguards for their own second-order specific investments. 
Suppose that managers try to achieve an “efficiency frontier” 
where, given a certain level of their own specific investments, the in-
vestments of the other individuals (workers and shareholders) are stimu-
lated as much as possible by using appropriate safeguards. Even in these 
cases, at least along this efficiency frontier, some tradeoffs are likely to 
arise. If workers have strong safeguards in their jobs, managers may lack 
the authority to carry out their plans and to safeguard their own specific 
investments in human capital. Similarly, allowing managers excessive 
                                                 
 30. See Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, Co-evolution of Politics and Corporate Governance, 
29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 106, 108 (2009). In an arms-race, the incentive to invest in armaments 
depends on the level of investments in weapons made by the potential enemy. Low-armament and 
high-armament equilibria are both possible outcomes of this game. 
 31. See Ugo Pagano, Public Markets, Private Orderings and Corporate Governance, 20 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 453, 470–71 (2000), which stated, 
high “second order” specific investment in the appropriate private orderings were neces-
sary to guarantee a more efficient cooperation [between managers involved in creating 
GM products]. In other words, the purpose of the merger seems to be an introduction of a 
system of private governance where some fair exercise of power could decrease the hold-
up risks faced by all the agents investing in cospecific human capital. 
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authority may easily jeopardize workers’ specific investments. Certain 
arrangements—such as allowing shareholders to easily fire or sue the 
managers—may give strong safeguards for financial investments, but 
they may discourage the (second-order) specific investments of the man-
agers. If managers have a high degree of job security, then their specific 
investments in their company may be encouraged, but their security may 
scare shareholders who find it too difficult to get rid of an opportunistic 
manager. 
Because the ownership of capital can be more concentrated or dis-
persed than labor power, we cannot a priori say which factor may more 
easily overcome its collective action problems and eventually gain more 
safeguards at the expenses of other factors. There is, however, an inter-
esting asymmetry. 
The control of capital can be concentrated by ordinary market 
transactions well beyond the control of labor power and, thanks to devic-
es such as pyramids, the concentration of power made possible by the 
wealth of the richest families. Thus, in the absence of political con-
straints, when economies of scale favor large-scale enterprises, the own-
ership of capital will be easily concentrated in a few hands through the 
effect of ordinary market contracts. By contrast, labor interests cannot be 
concentrated by using simple economic transactions. A collective action 
problem must necessarily be solved. For this reason, the political condi-
tions existing in different countries matter, and those conditions that pre-
vailed at the time of the emergence of big firms are particularly influen-
tial with regard to the path of that nation’s institutional development. 
A strong democracy is likely to find the unilateral concentration of 
economic wealth in a few dynasties to be unhealthy and will try to set 
limits on the concentration of economic power. This may also weaken 
the incentives to build labor organizations that can balance the concen-
trated interests of the owners. By contrast, if a strong democracy is ab-
sent and there is widespread acceptance of dynastic rules, a few families 
can easily rule large enterprises. In this case, a social-democratic reaction 
would likely take place after some time, which would result in concentra-
tion of the interests of both owners and workers. 
If a democracy was already established by the time large enterprises 
became important for economic development, the concentration of inter-
ests of capital owners could be tamed. In this sense, the Berle and Means 
Corporation required fairly uncommon “political roots,” which produced 
a set of tradeoffs very favorable to managers and tamed the concentration 
of shareholders’ (and eventually workers’) interests. In most countries, 
such a democratic state was missing at the dawn of the growth of big 
business, and they were bound to follow different institutional paths. 
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The state has two crucial roles, one as a model for and another as a 
constraint on corporations. As states decentralized, they lost the monopo-
ly on being a legal person but maintained influence by bestowing their 
model upon civil society. Each state’s model of organization had a cru-
cial role in shaping the nature of the corporations in that particular coun-
try. An aristocratic state, ruled by few, was likely to generate relatively 
more dynastically ruled corporations than a democratic state. 
The state was not only a model for the corporations but was also a 
limiter of the power to incorporate. Without such limits, the power to 
incorporate allowed the possibility of economic empires of unprecedent-
ed dimensions that could easily challenge the state’s own power. The 
Berle and Means Corporation emerged as a particular answer to this 
challenge. Antimonopoly legislation and the inhibition of pyramids (and 
of other ways by which partial ownership could multiply their influence) 
were only some of the tools available to an early democratic state. More 
important was the emerging principle that “[c]orporations are essentially 
political constructs”32 and can “be made subject to those limitations 
which inhibit state action to protect individual freedom.”33 In this case, it 
was the model of the democratic state to set limits on the organizations to 
which it had granted some of its typical privileges. 
III. ARISTOCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
This Part compares two idealized examples of the democratic ver-
sus aristocratic political roots of modern corporate governance. It also 
provides examples of corporations modeling themselves after the operat-
ing governmental structures and demonstrates that the corporate struc-
tures are significantly influenced by their political environments. Though 
this Part extrapolates from real-life historical processes, it asserts that an 
analysis of these extreme cases is useful for comparing the actual institu-
tional pattern followed by different countries. 
The case of aristocratic roots can be schematized as follows. For a 
long time, society was accustomed to a concentration of political and 
economic power in the hands of a few families, such as a royal family or 
an aristocracy. The rule of dynastic succession had been accepted as the 
legitimate way of transmitting political and economic power, and upward 
mobility was discouraged. Individuals were supposed to fill the same 
social roles of their parents, and upwardly mobile individuals were often 
                                                 
 32. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at xxvi. 
 33. Id. at xviii. 
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despised.34 When large firms became the dominant vehicle for economic 
development, the new industrial aristocracy, which controlled firms be-
yond even the means of their considerable wealth, was not challenged by 
an established democratic state. The new industrial giants were embed-
ded in a society where, despite numerous rebellions, dynastic power was 
still widespread and accepted as legitimate. Capitalist dynasties could 
increase their power thanks to their own wealth and accumulation of cap-
ital, which was allowed by large-scale firms. They could also extend 
their control beyond their wealth thanks to pyramids and other financial 
arrangements. Members of the large owning families served as managers 
of the firms. Small shareholders had no chance to fire these “dynastic” 
managers, and professional managers were confronted with a socially 
exclusive group of wealthy individuals who enjoyed a de facto tenure 
thanks to their family links. Faced with the concentrated interests of capi-
talist dynasties, workers reacted by concentrating their interests into un-
ions and social-democratic parties. 
The story of democratic roots can be told in an analogous way. So-
ciety’s wealth was relatively dispersed and political power was handled 
through democratic mechanisms, though often with the exclusion of a 
large majority of society. The rule of dynastic succession had been re-
moved from the political arena, even if it was widespread in the econom-
ic arena, which was dominated by small firms. Individuals were not sup-
posed to fill the same social roles as their parents and upwardly mobile 
individuals commanded high social esteem. When large firms emerged 
as the most efficient form of organization in many sectors, the extension 
of dynastic rule to these organizations was met with opposition by a large 
part of society. Smaller owners were scared of being out-competed by 
large organizations, minority shareholders were ready to defend their 
rights, professional managers felt cheated by the role that family connec-
tions played in their careers, and most important, politicians who gained 
office through democratic competition felt threatened by the power of the 
new industrial aristocracies. Industrial dynasties were not allowed to in-
crease their power beyond the limits of their wealth, and they faced a 
sharp choice between the advantages of asset diversification and concen-
trated control. In the absence of dynastically concentrated control, work-
ers’ incentive to concentrate their power in unions was also rather weak. 
                                                 
 34. According to Ernest Gellner, these social and cultural barriers characterized all ancient 
agrarian societies. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 29–32 (1983). Industrialization 
was associated with cultural homogenization and nationalism that allowed individuals to be more 
horizontally and vertically mobile. Id. at 22–23. For a discussion on Gellner’s contribution to politi-
cal economy, see generally Ugo Pagano, Nationalism, Development and Integration: The Political 
Economy of Ernest Gellner, 27 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON . 623 (2003). 
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In this situation, professional managers could become the rulers of Berle 
and Means Corporations. 
There are several reasons why different political roots could en-
trench each system of corporate governance. This Article will now focus 
on two reasons that stem from the analysis contained in the preceding 
section. 
The first reason is considered by Mark Roe’s theory that relates 
concentrated control with social democracy.35 Even if the growth of 
strong unions and social democracy was initially stimulated by the preex-
istence of concentrated, private dynastic power, their formation made the 
persistence of this power more likely. Once strong unions exist, profes-
sional managers are more likely to be captured by the interests of the 
workers. Shareholders need to concentrate their interests to balance the 
safeguards and rights that the workers may obtain. 
A concentrated equilibrium may arise where both the workers and 
the majority-block shareholder have strong safeguards, while managers 
(and often minority shareholders) have weak safeguards. By contrast, a 
dispersed equilibrium may occur if the concentrated control of the large 
firms is not allowed to arise. In this case, a fair internal labor market may 
weaken the incentive to unionize. Thus, even if the weakness of the un-
ions is an effect of the dispersion of ownership, owners can still delegate 
control to managers because unions are weak. This “disarmament equi-
librium” generates the implicit conditions necessary for the high degree 
of managerial independence that characterize the Berle and Means Cor-
poration. 
The second reason why the dispersed and concentrated equilibria 
may be stable has to do with the “specificity argument” that we have 
considered in the preceding section. 
Different political roots favor safeguards and rights that in turn 
stimulate particular investments, which biases technology toward devel-
oping in a certain direction.36 Rights and safeguards stimulate specific 
                                                 
 35. See ROE, supra note 7, at 3–5 (“[S]ocial democracies denigrate the modern pro-shareholder 
tools—such as incentive compensation, hostile takeovers, shareholder wealth maximization norms, 
etc.—because it is not their policy to promote purely shareholder values.”). 
 36. For more information on the relationship between technological characteristics, property 
rights, and organizational form, see Ugo Pagano, Bounded Rationality and Institutionalism, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: A CRITICAL READER 19 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter Bounded Rationality]; Ugo Pagano, Property Rights, Asset Specificity, and the Division 
of Labour Under Alternative Capitalist Relations, 15 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 315 (1991), reprinted in 
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS (Geoffrey M. Hodgson ed., 1993); Ugo Pagano, Interlocking 
Complementarities and Institutional Change, 7 J. INSTL. ECON. 373 (2011) [hereinafter Interlocking 
Complementarities]. It is estimated that the direction of causation from ownership, organization, and 
organizational form to technology “turns out to be stronger than the reverse.” John S. Earle, Ugo 
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investments, and sunk costs favor the organization of these vested inter-
ests, reinforcing the safeguards and rights that inspired them. Thus, self-
reinforcing multiple-organizational equilibria may arise from the interac-
tion between the nature of the factors that are used and the allocation of 
property rights, and may define different paths of institutional and tech-
nological change. 
For instance, a concentrated equilibrium creates strong safeguards 
for the members of the owning family to make specific investments in 
the firm. And because of the counterbalancing safeguards, workers may 
also have some similar incentives. By contrast, managers in this equilib-
rium have weak incentives to make these specific investments. 
At the same time, the existence of these specific investments makes 
both family owners and workers more willing to increase their security in 
the organization. The opposite argument holds for professional manag-
ers, who may not claim appropriate safeguards for their specific skills 
because in absence of these safeguards, they have invested negligible 
amounts in firm-specific human capital. The distribution of rights tends 
to generate complementary technologies, which entrenches the status 
quo. 
Because of these two (and other)37 mechanisms, aristocratic and 
democratic roots can entrench corporate-governance systems in a con-
centrated or dispersed equilibrium. 
In this argument, concentration and dispersion refer to the organi-
zation of the interests of owners and workers. In terms of the size of the 
firms, the implications may be rather different. Indeed, a concentrated 
equilibrium is likely to be characterized by firms that tend to be smaller 
than those characterizing a dispersed equilibrium. Even if family dynas-
ties have numerous means to expand their control well beyond the limits 
set by their wealth, there are still limits to that expansion. In most cases, 
the only possible way to keep the firm under control is to limit its size 
and, often, its efficiency. By contrast, as Berle and Means noted, the dis-
persion of ownership was a centrifugal force complementary to, and in-
deed often necessary for, concentration of power in the hands of a few 
corporate managers.38 Impeding the dispersion of ownership could be 
tantamount to encouraging the concentration of economic power and in-
efficiently constraining the size of firms. 
                                                                                                             
Pagano & Maria Lesi, Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market, 
60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 471, 472 (2006). 
 37. See, e.g., Morck et al., supra note 29, at 657. 
 38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that the dispersion of ownership is comple-
mented by a “centripetal force, tending more and more to concentrate [power] in the hands of a few 
corporate managers”). 
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IV. THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION 
Most countries have gone through a laborious transition from the 
feudal order typical of agrarian societies to some form of capitalist or-
ganization. At the time of the second Industrial Revolution, when large 
firms started to become dominant in some sectors, the residual political 
prestige of the aristocracy and the aristocratic aspirations of the bour-
geoisie were still evident in Europe. Only the United States manifested as 
an important exception to this pattern. In no other country was the 
Veblenian instinct for workmanship so appreciated relative to pure pecu-
niary acquisition, and dynastic privileges so despised.39 
With reference to actual historical experiences, the theoretical 
scheme considered in the preceding Part involves a striking asymmetry. 
While the case of aristocratic roots covers many historical cases, the case 
of democratic roots includes only one important case—the United States. 
Indeed, there are so many historical cases of aristocratic roots that con-
trasting a stylized general model of aristocratic roots to the American 
experience has obvious limitations. 
With the exception of the United States and possibly Switzerland,40 
large organizations in all major capitalist economies had aristocratic 
roots in the specific sense outlined in the preceding Part. At the time of 
the second Industrial Revolution, aristocratic dynastic succession still 
had a strong legitimacy in society. Cultural class barriers were strong and 
accepted, and the aristocracy still had a disproportionate influence in po-
litical affairs. Democratization was taking place in most of these coun-
tries, but unlike the case of the United States, the process was heavily 
                                                 
 39. Veblen emphasized the contrast between workmanship, pecuniary instincts, and the pro-
gressive role of engineers with respect to businessmen and other people that receive their earnings 
from the trade and ownership of industrial property. VEBLEN, supra note 2, at 41–45; see also 
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN (Charles Camic & Geoffrey M. Hodgson eds., 2011); 
Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 
(2011). Veblen’s approach involved the belief that habits of thought and institutional complementa-
rities played an important role in the evolution of society. Charles Camic & Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 
Introduction to ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN, supra, at 20. For a comparison of the 
Veblen approach with the neoclassical analysis based on unbounded rational actors, see generally 
Pagano, Bounded Rationality, supra note 36. 
 40. Switzerland also achieved early liberation from feudal relations. See JONATHAN 
STEINBERG, WHY SWITZERLAND? 46 (2d ed. 1996). Swiss feudal ties were traditionally weak. The 
peasants were difficult to dominate because they were often far from urban centers on Alpine pas-
tures and had good military training (often serving as highly sought-after mercenaries throughout 
Europe). Id. at 17, 21–23. After the defeat of the Sonderbund alliance, formed in 1847 by the con-
servative and Catholic Cantons, the “Swiss Confederation or, more accurately, some twenty-three 
leading figures in it, drafted a document so suited to the conditions that the Switzerland of 1849 and 
of 1847 seem to belong to different eras.” Id. at 47. Similar to the United States (where the American 
Civil War terminated the political influence of the slave-owning aristocracy of the South), Swiss big 
business had democratic roots in the sense that a full-blown post-feudal society had already emerged 
before the second Industrial Revolution. See id. at 55–57. 
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influenced by the various roles that the landed aristocracy had played in 
capitalist development. 
In his classic book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Barrington Moore pointed out that the behavior of the landed aristocracy 
was rather different in the industrializing European countries.41 In Eng-
land, a strong landed aristocracy was the leading factor in the initial 
phase of modernization.42 The aristocracy was open to some integration 
of other wealthy individuals and adopted a positive attitude toward in-
dustrialization.43 The aristocracy was the most important force in the 
“Puritan Revolution,” which eventually led to the establishment of a con-
stitutional monarchy.44 But because of the flexibility of the British aris-
tocracy, all sorts of dynastic privileges were legitimate during the second 
Industrial Revolution.45 Members of the aristocratic families that be-
longed to the proper aristocratic circles were controlling firms much be-
yond their financial opportunities, and for those outside of the proper 
class, a managerial career was rather difficult.46 On the other side of the 
social divide, class barriers gave strong incentives for the development of 
unions and socialist politics. For a long time, a concentrated equilibrium 
characterized British firms. The following section considers in what 
sense this equilibrium has disintegrated and whether an “Anglo-
American” model of corporate governance can be discerned. For the 
moment, we can observe that, in spite of—or perhaps because of—the 
metamorphosis of the British aristocracy, it is appropriate to consider 
Britain as an evident case of the aristocratic roots of corporate govern-
ance. 
Whereas the aristocracy became an important, active force in the 
British economic and political transformation, the French aristocracy 
continued to rely on traditional feudal privileges.47 In England, a mutat-
ing aristocracy carried out the process of modernization against the 
King.48 In France, with the support of an emerging bourgeois class and of 
a growing centralized bureaucracy, the King imposed modernization on a 
static aristocracy.49 French absolutism, not British aristocratic-
parliamentary democracy, was the prevailing trend in France before the 
                                                 
 41. MOORE, supra note 5. 
 42. Id. at 8–9, 13. 
 43. Id. at 29–30. 
 44. Id. at 19–20. 
 45. Id. at 425. 
 46. See id. at 37. 
 47. Id. at 40. 
 48. Id. at 16 (“In England the main dirty work of [destroying the ancient régime] was the sym-
bolic act of beheading Charles I.”). 
 49. Id. at 57. 
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French Revolution. The revolution, in some respects, completed the work 
of the Bourbons.50 While the French Revolution gave a democratic turn 
to the modernization of France, the post-Napoleonic reaction implied that 
at the time of the second Industrial Revolution, class barriers and aristo-
cratic political privileges were still important in France.51 In order to get 
top managerial jobs, proper manners and good family connections mat-
tered more than abilities and hard work. Workers reacted to these class 
barriers by forming unions and engaging in various rebellious activities. 
France and England took different paths to democratization and 
modernization. But at the time of the second Industrial Revolution, both 
countries were still characterized by both an aristocracy with pervasive 
political power and a widespread acceptance of dynastic privilege. In 
both countries, most individuals were excluded from this system of privi-
leges, which led them to organize into unions and socialist parties. Also, 
many professional managers had little autonomy and power in their firms 
because they were beholden to aristocratic interests. 
The weight of the aristocracy was even heavier in European coun-
tries that industrialized later. In England, the landed aristocracy adopted 
many entrepreneurial habits; in Germany, it was the entrepreneurs who 
were taking lessons.52 “In nineteenth-century Prussia the members of the 
bourgeoisie who became connected with the aristocracy generally ab-
sorbed the latter’s habits and outlook.”53 Because of this behavior, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the process of democratization was 
not only incomplete but it was also very uncertain. Not surprisingly, the 
resulting German concentrated equilibrium took a much more authoritar-
ian and sometimes tragic path. 
In spite of the numerous differences between early- and late-
industrializing countries, none of them had a political system capable of 
taming the power of new industrial dynasties associated with the growth 
of big business. The challenge to this power would come later, only 
when the individuals who were excluded from these privileges finally 
organized their interests. 
The only exception54 to this general pattern was the United States. 
Since the early beginnings, the British North American colonies had 
                                                 
 50. See id. at 63. 
 51. In the restoration period, a Bourbon king reigned again (from 1815 to 1830), and the aris-
tocracy commanded considerable social prestige for a long time thereafter. 
 52. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 37. 
 53. Id. 
 54. In the (rather extreme) words of de Tocqueville, “No great democratic republic has yet 
existed. It would be an insult to republics to use that name for the oligarchy which ruled France in 
1793. Only the United States presents this new phenomenon.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 118 (3d ed. 1994). 
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been a refuge from aristocratic and ecclesiastical authority. Moreover, by 
the time of the second Industrial Revolution, the United States had un-
dergone two major democratic revolutions: the American Revolutionary 
War and the American Civil War. With the major exceptions of the 
treatment of African-Americans and Native-Americans (and of women’s 
inability to vote or otherwise meaningfully participate in public life at 
that time), the United States approximated the democratic roots consid-
ered previously. From the beginning, the U.S. Constitution was shaped 
by the idea that only an appropriate system of checks and balances can 
support individual freedom—in James Madison’s words, that “[a]mbition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”55 “A properly designed state, the 
Fathers believed, would check interest with interest, class with class, fac-
tion with faction, and one branch of government with another in a har-
monious system of mutual frustration.”56 
The Founding Fathers were aware that an adequate mechanism of 
reciprocal guarantees should not rely only on the Constitution. In their 
view, it was also important that economic power not be concentrated in a 
few hands. Thomas Jefferson’s democracy relied on a society where 
wealth was diffused among educated farmers57 and where economic 
power could not be monopolized. It was as early as 1832 when, in this 
vein, President Andrew Jackson confronted the power of the Bank of the 
United States.58 He vetoed the recharter of the bank and was reelected by 
running a populist presidential campaign in defense of the “humble 
members of society” against “exclusive privileges.”59 
The remaining vestiges of European landed aristocracy in the Unit-
ed States, primarily in the form of slaveowners in the South, were further 
erased by the victory of the Union in the Civil War. The free soil ideolo-
gy,60 which advocated the prevention of slavery in the West, offered the 
material arguments to sustain freedom and widespread small ownership. 
This ideology, combined with the rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln, generat-
ed the unifying feeling of the Union against the pro-slavery states of the 
South. Lincoln insisted that the new territories should offer “homes for 
free white people” and that this could not be if slavery was planted with-
                                                 
 55. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO 
MADE IT 8 (1948) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)). 
 56. Id. at 8–9. 
 57. Id. at 41. 
 58. Id. at 60–61. 
 59. Id. at 60. 
 60. The idea that the free lands of the West should be available for free people and forbidden 
for slavery gained impressive momentum before the Civil War and found its most vocal expression 
in the “Free Soil Party.” See e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY 
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970). 
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in them. “Slave States are places for poor white people to remove from, 
not to remove to.”61 After the Civil War, no variety of landed aristocracy 
had a relevant role in the political and economic organization of Ameri-
can society. By the time of the second Industrial Revolution, the distrust 
for concentrated economic power was already well-rooted in the society 
of the United States. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, American society al-
ready deeply distrusted attempts to concentrate economic power. At that 
time, President Theodore Roosevelt could apply antitrust laws against 
such industry giants as J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller. Passed in 
1890, the Sherman Act could be used against both business mergers and 
workers’ unions. For the few first years, it was primarily used against 
unions. By using antitrust laws, Roosevelt could continue the battle 
against concentrations of economic power among the privileged few, 
echoing the confrontation between President Jackson and the Bank of the 
United States. Theodore Roosevelt, however, was frightened by big 
business for reasons that were political more than economic in nature. 
“He was not a small entrepreneur, worrying about being squeezed out, 
nor an ordinary consumer concerned about rising prices, but a big politi-
cian facing a strong rival in the business of achieving power.”62 
Big business was accepted as a necessary development of the se-
cond Industrial Revolution. The problem Theodore Roosevelt faced was 
how to make big business and the growing power of unions compatible 
with democracy. Theodore Roosevelt believed that the survival of inde-
pendent political power required that both capital and labor accept the 
regulation of the state. “Because he feared the great corporations as well 
as the organized workers and farmers, Theodore Roosevelt came to think 
of himself as representing the golden mean.”63 Both concentrated powers 
had to somehow be tamed and dispersed. Yet, in the case of business, the 
dispersion of owner power was not intended to limit the size of the firm. 
Even if with different tones, the American political tradition started 
by Jefferson and Jackson was continued by President Woodrow Wilson 
and later by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In his 1912 electoral 
campaign, Wilson clarified why the power of big business should be 
tamed, maintaining that the real danger was not “the existence of the 
great individual combinations,” but rather the “combination of the com-
                                                 
 61. HOFSTADTER, supra note 55, at 111–12 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Peoria, Illi-
nois (Oct. 16, 1854)). The viewpoint was that slavery should not be extended to new territories and 
could unite all the antislavery individuals independent of whether they were abolitionists or “Negro-
phobes.” Id. at 112. 
 62. Id. at 222. 
 63. Id. at 217. 
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binations.”64 “What we have to do—he said—is to disentangle this colos-
sal community of interests . . . to pull apart, and gently but firmly and 
persistently dissect.”65 The asymmetric nature of this dissection became 
very clear in the 1914 Clayton Act. Section 6 of the Clayton Act blocked 
the possibility of applying antitrust law to labor: “The labor of a human 
being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in 
the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation 
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the 
purposes of mutual help . . . .”66 Unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Act reinforced the bite of antitrust action against big business. According 
to § 7 of the Act, the ownership of the stock of one corporation by anoth-
er was forbidden whenever “the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks 
or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies 
or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly.”67 
The United States Supreme Court has echoed the concerns of Wil-
son and FDR about allowing businesses to concentrate their power. In 
the United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. antitrust case in 
1957, the Court provided a definitive interpretation of the limitations 
concerning the acquisition of stocks.68 The Court clarified that anticom-
petitive circumstances stemming from the acquisition of stock could 
emerge much later than the moment the acquisition was made.69 The ac-
quisition of stock could be challenged at any time (du Pont was filed 
many years after the acquisition). Moreover, the threat of limiting com-
petition could arise independent of the good or bad intentions of the cor-
porate agents, and could be applied to both vertical and horizontal acqui-
sition (du Pont concerned a vertical acquisition).70 Even if § 7 had been, 
in the words of the dissenting Mr. Justice Burton, a “sleeping giant,”71 
                                                 
 64. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE 
GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 187 (1921). 
 65. Id. at 188. 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 68. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). The case related to 
the acquisition of 23% of General Motors by du Pont between 1917 and 1919, a few years after the 
Clayton Act was passed. Id. 
 69. Id. at 597. 
 70. Id. at 590–91, 607. 
 71. Id. at 611 (Burton, J., dissenting). Justice Burton, one of the justices dissenting from the 
majority decision of the Court, observed: 
The Court’s decision is far reaching . . . . [O]ver 40 years after the enactment of the Clay-
ton Act, it now becomes apparent for the first time that § 7 has been a sleeping giant all 
along. Every corporation which has acquired a stock interest in another corporation after 
the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, and which has had business dealings with that 
corporation is exposed, retroactively, to the bite of the newly discovered teeth of § 7. 
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the threat of waking up Wilson’s creature contributed to his explicit goal 
of “gently but firmly and persistently dissect[ing]” the “combinations of 
combinations.”72 
Indeed, the Act pushed wealthy stockowners toward two extreme 
choices. One choice was to disperse their stocks and have little control in 
each one of them. The other option was to concentrate their stock in one 
business, enjoy the benefits of control, and forsake the advantages of di-
versification. The first option was often considered to be safer for the 
offspring of the entrepreneur, while the second was more appropriate for 
initial innovative entrepreneurship, as well as temporary takeovers of 
inefficient managerial firms to allow them to be resold on the market. 
Democratic roots inhibited the possibility of choosing the intermediate 
solution of diversifying in related business without losing control—a 
common option in the aristocratic origin countries. In those countries, 
with the help of political power and financial institutions and with the 
use of pyramids, a new industrial aristocracy could keep its power and 
profit by forms of “tunneling.”73 
FDR clearly expressed the antidynastic nature of the American 
model of corporate governance by denouncing the “economic royalists” 
who “gathered other people’s money” to “impose a new industrial dicta-
torship,” and who had taken unwarranted economic power through the 
use of devices such as holding companies.74 He again recognized a co-
herent line in the American political tradition: “The country is going 
through a repetition of Jackson’s fight with the Bank of the United 
States—only a far bigger and broader basis.”75 This economic royalism 
of the very few was leading to a form of “private socialism.” Roosevelt 
believed that only the fragmentation of finance could lead to the kind of 
dispersed equilibrium considered previously in this Article and avoid the 
danger of “government socialism.” He claimed, “I am against private 
socialism of concentrated economic power as thoroughly as I am against 
government socialism. The one is equally as dangerous as the other; and 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 610–11. See generally Robert W. Harbeson, The Clayton Act: Sleeping Giant of Antitrust?, 48 
AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1958) (providing a critical evaluation of the statements that § 7 has been a 
“sleeping giant”). 
 72. WILSON, supra note 64, at 187. 
 73. In this context, the term “tunneling” refers to the act of transferring value from one pyra-
mid firm to another of the same group. Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 
(2000). Tunneling lifts assets and income from lower to higher firms (that are controlled by the 
family) and moves losses and liabilities in the opposite direction. Id. at 22–23. Morck, Wolfenzon, 
and Yeung observed that it is analogous to what multinationals do with transfer prices to avoid taxes. 
Morck et al., supra note 29, at 679. 
 74. ROE, supra note 18, at 40. 
 75. Id. 
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destruction of private socialism is utterly essential to avoid government 
socialism.”76 
The first Roosevelt administration associated pyramidal business 
groups with corporate-governance problems, disproportionate market 
power, and an objectionable concentration of economic power. In the 
1930s, the administration explicitly included the double (and multiple) 
taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another (called “intercorporate 
dividends”) as a part of a package of tax and other policies aimed at 
eliminating pyramidal business groups in the United States.77 The pro-
gram, which was already spelled out in Wilson’s Clayton Act, was effec-
tive. The destruction of the private socialism made by the pyramidal 
business groups became an irreversible characteristic of American corpo-
rate governance. And in this way the Berle and Means Public Corpora-
tion, characterized by the separation of ownership and control, became 
an exceptional characteristic of its economy. These roots ran deep and 
could be traced back to the society imagined by Jefferson, a society of 
educated farmers who believed in religious tolerance and rejected any 
form of royal or dynastic rule. “Lord and peasant in the making in the 
modern world”78 actually came true outside America. But in the United 
States, the growth of big business was not conditioned on one particular 
form of aristocratic roots, and the timely fragmentation of finance and 
ownership eventually led to a dispersed equilibrium before the Second 
World War. 
As anticipated in the preceding Part, this equilibrium was dispersed 
in terms of ownership but was characterized by the largest firms in the 
world. Dispersion of ownership and centralized managerial control im-
plied that firms could grow beyond the limitations of the financial (and 
often political) means of the controlling family. The policies, rooted in 
the American social and political history, were not against big business 
but were against the concentrated power of their owners. These policies 
made the owners smaller and the firms bigger than in the other countries. 
V. THE MYTH OF AN ANGLO-SAXON MODEL 
This Part critiques the hypothesis that Britain and the United States 
share a common Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, and ar-
gues that a more complex biodiversity of capitalism is at play than the 
traditional Anglo-Saxon versus continental debate considers. 
                                                 
 76. Id. at 39 (quoting remarks by Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
 77. Randall Morck, How to Eliminate the Pyramidal Business Groups—The Double Taxation 
of Inter-Corporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy 9–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10944, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10944. 
 78. This is the subtitle of MOORE, supra note 5. 
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In much economic and political literature, there is a great emphasis 
on a common Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American model of corporate gov-
ernance, which is sharply distinguished from a continental model. In par-
ticular, the legal-origins approach has attributed the divide existing be-
tween the two groups of countries to the different common law and civil 
law traditions.79 But as analyzed in the previous Part, the focus should 
not be on the legal-origins approach, but rather on the particular aristo-
cratic and democratic political roots of the countries at issue. 
Given the variety of aristocratic roots, it is likely that the types of 
political roots that have characterized Britain have had the effect of push-
ing it closer to the American model than to other European countries’ 
models. It is enough to mention only a few of the many similarities be-
tween the two countries. They share a common history and have a com-
mon language, and the British Puritanic Revolution had an important 
impact on the nature of the “American Soul.” Moreover, both countries 
were defined by the remarkable stability of their early democratic politi-
cal institutions, even though the British institutions included such aristo-
cratic institutions as the monarchy and House of Lords. But despite these 
similarities, the different political roots had a strong impact on Britian’s 
development, and its partial and late shift to a model of dispersed equi-
librium is consistent with our story. 
According to Alfred Chandler, in the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury there 
came into being a new economic institution, the managerial busi-
ness enterprise, and a new subspecies of economic man, the salaried 
manager. With their coming, the world received a new type of capi-
talism—one in which the decisions about current operations, em-
ployment, output, and the allocation of resources for future opera-
tions were made by salaried managers who were not owners of the 
enterprise.80 
According to Chandler, while the coming of managerial capitalism 
made the United States one of the two most important actors of the se-
cond Industrial Revolution (the other being Germany), Britain—the main 
actor of the first Industrial Revolution—became a late industrializer in 
                                                 
 79. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). An 
econometric analysis showed that a “coevolution approach” can explain differences in corporate-
governance systems better than the legal-origin school. See Belloc & Pagano, supra note 30, at 106–
07 (explaining the coevolution approach); Belloc & Pagano, supra note 9, at 9–10 (providing an 
econometric analysis). The case of England adds a qualitative dimension to this comparison. As 
discussed in Part V, while we can explain why England’s coevolution pattern involved a shift from a 
concentrated to a dispersed system of corporate governance, the legal-origin approach is incompati-
ble with this double affiliation of the British system. 
 80. CHANDLER, supra note 13, at 2. 
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many of the new industries.81 In Britain, the commitment to the model of 
personal capitalism that had been so successful at the time of the first 
Industrial Revolution continued. While long-term profits based on long-
term growth were a goal about which the managers and major investors 
of American (and German) managerial firms could agree, the families 
owning the British firms often preferred to pay out earning in dividends, 
rather than using them to make the extensive investments required to 
move into foreign markets or to develop new products in related indus-
tries. 
“Because [British] firms grew slowly and because they hired only a 
small numbers of managers, the founders and their families remained 
influential in the affairs of the enterprise and so affected dividend poli-
cy.”82 By contrast, the long-term growth of American firms helped the 
managers gain strong job rights in their firms. These gains “not only 
helped to assure tenure for the senior executives, but [they] also en-
hanced the opportunity for advancement for the more junior managers.”83 
British firms did not provide similar opportunities to nonowning manag-
ers. The key managerial positions were usually reserved for the owning 
family. Social and family ties were more important than competence to 
advance in the managerial ladder. There were few opportunities for jun-
ior managers, and no job security similar to those of American firms 
could be given to senior executives. According to Chandler, the organi-
zational capabilities that were so important for the successful firms of the 
second Industrial Revolution had stagnated in Britain, and as a result, the 
nation was no longer the economic leader of the world.84 
Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi supported but also 
qualified the account given by Chandler.85 They argued that at beginning 
of last century, the dominance of British families was more evident in 
terms of control than ownership. At that time, 
[t]he observations on the dominance of families in the running of 
firms are a reflection of their board representation rather than their 
ownership. Board participation by families became disproportionate 
to their ownership stakes. There were good reasons for being con-
                                                 
 81. Id. at 250–51. 
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cerned about this development. The divergence between ownership 
and control undermined the efficient running of corporations, as 
documented by Chandler.86 
But the capital of the families became so diluted that some of the usual 
“continental” defenses against takeovers emerged. The British corporate-
governance system “[f]or a brief period in 1950s and 1960s . . . began to 
resemble that of Continental Europe.”87 Eventually, the overwhelming 
political preponderance of the city blocked that solution: 
It was therefore the financial sector that prevented the United King-
dom from drifting into a Continental-style corporate structure with 
dual-class shares, pyramids, and limitations on take-overs . . . . The 
financial sector also prevented the corporate sector from erecting 
the takeover defenses, in particular poison pills, that became com-
mon place in the United States.88 
Britain ended up with a corporate system with a limited family owner-
ship, as well as a financial sector that was much more concentrated and 
powerful than what existed in the United States. Financial fragmentation 
remained a distinctive characteristic of the United States. 
The divide between American and British corporate governance be-
comes even wider when one considers the different roles of trade unions 
and the different systems of social protection in each nation. Because of 
the aristocratic roots of its industrial society, British workers developed a 
strong sense of class identity and created very powerful trade unions 
immediately after the Industrial Revolution.89 After World War II, while 
the degree of concentration of ownership was quickly decreasing, British 
trade unions held their centralized power as well as their political 
strength. They even had the capability of provoking the fall of a govern-
ment.90 
In Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, ownership had become dis-
persed while unions’ power was highly concentrated. This “disequilibri-
um” was also associated with difficult industrial relations and low 
productivity, and supports Roe’s hypothesis that dispersed ownership 
may be incompatible with strong unions.91 This disequilibrium lasted 
until the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher weakened the powers of the 
unions—a policy that Tony Blair did not substantially reverse even after 
                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 604. 
 88. Id. at 605. 
 89. EDWARD P. THOMSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 194 (1963). 
 90. It happened, for example, in 1974 when the miners’ strike caused the end of Edward 
Heath’s government. 
 91. See ROE, supra note 7, at 21. 
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the Labour Party’s landslide victory in 1997. In this way, Britain has set-
tled into a “new equilibrium” where a system of partial dispersion of 
ownership meets a partial weakening of the powers of the unions. This 
new equilibrium makes Britain the economy closest to the United States 
in terms of employment protection and ownership dispersion. But the 
closeness is too recent and the divide between the two countries is still 
too wide to talk about a unique “Anglo-Saxon” model of corporate gov-
ernance. At the moment, the aristocratic and democratic roots of the two 
models continue to be relevant, and the recent economic crisis is putting 
an unprecedented pressure on the dominance of finance, which has char-
acterized the British system. 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOR AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The United States and Britain demonstrate only one part of the im-
portant relation between the characteristics of labor and financial mar-
kets. In general, the greater the level of ownership dispersion in financial 
markets, the less workers feel the need to be organized and safeguard 
against their employers and the weaker the level of employment protec-
tion. 
If we consider the relation between dispersion of ownership and 
employment protection in all the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, it is clear that the United 
States and United Kingdom represent one extreme of the inverse relation 
between these two variables. 
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Figure 1 plots an index of employment protection against an index 
of ownership dispersion92 for a sample of twenty OECD countries. Con-
tinental Europe and Japan cluster in the northwest quadrant, with strong 
employment-protection legislation and concentrated ownership, and with 
the extreme positions occupied by France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain.93 At the other extreme is the United States, with the lowest degree 
of protection of employees’ rights and the highest degree of ownership 
dispersion. Even though some distance exists between the two, the Unit-
ed Kingdom is the country closest to the United States, with Canada and 
Ireland occupying similar positions to the United Kingdom. 
In this relation, it is likely that causation can flow from the charac-
teristics of labor markets to those of financial markets and vice versa. 
                                                 
 92. Given a sample of ten medium-sized firms with stock-market capitalization in 1995, Own-
ership is an index that equals one if there is no controlling shareholder and zero if one does exist. 
EPL stands for employment-protection legislation and is averaged over the period from 1993 to 
2002. More detailed information on the variables can be found in Belloc & Pagano, supra note 30, at 
110–11. 
 93. Nordic countries like Sweden, which have in the past years had a fairly dynamic economy, 
occupy the northwestern quadrant. The high ownership concentration of Sweden and its relation to 
social democracy is discussed by Peter Hogfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership 
in Sweden, in HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 517. 
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Roe argued that it is mainly labor markets influencing financial mar-
kets.94 He observed that countries with strong social democracies that are 
characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to exhibit a strong and 
concentrated corporate-ownership structure.95 In Roe’s approach, the 
separation of ownership and control that characterizes many American 
large firms is not due to “better” corporate laws that protect minority 
shareholders, nor is it due to the different legal origins that characterize 
the different countries.96 In his view, it is the absence of a social-
democratic political pressure that, without strong and present owners, 
induces managers to collude with employees.97 Shareholders can diversi-
fy their investments only when employees’ organizations are weak. Oth-
erwise, only concentrated block holders can be trusted to resist employ-
ees’ pressure. 
Belloc and Pagano stressed the importance of the opposite flow of 
influence—from financial to labor markets.98 Dynastic-based concentrat-
ed systems of corporate governance may induce social-democratic reac-
tions, whereas workers’ organizations have difficulty in doing so because 
they are weaker in capitalist systems, where management jobs are open 
to a large section of the population. 
Joining together the two directions of causation reveals the possibil-
ity that processes of cumulative causation actually hold the answer. Ini-
tial political conditions influenced the system of corporate governance 
and induced workers to organize in centralized organizations, a move 
that feeds back to the system of corporate governance. Thus, political 
roots play an important role both in setting these different path-
dependent patterns of cumulative causation, and also in explaining why a 
country occupies a certain point of the regression line. The Berle and 
Means Public Company turns out to be an exceptional case—the closest 
one to a purely theoretical case—of a dispersed equilibrium. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Before the recent economic crisis, the good performance of the 
American economy had an effect similar to that of the earlier successes 
of the Japanese and the West German economies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
There was a rush to imitate American institutions and, in a particular, the 
public company. In this case, the pressure to imitate the American model 
was unusually strong. Some authors claimed that we had reached “the 
                                                 
 94. ROE, supra note 7, at 52. 
 95. Id. at 49. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Belloc & Pagano, supra note 30, at 106. 
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end of history for corporate law”;99 in other words, an inevitable univer-
sal convergence toward the Anglo-Saxon model. Other authors claimed 
that, for many reasons, the development of corporate ownership and gov-
ernance systems was likely to be path-dependent, and they focused on 
the complementarities existing among different domains of the economic 
system, which makes a global convergence toward a single model un-
likely.100 
The recent economic crisis and the increasing growth of newly in-
dustrializing countries, each with their different models of corporate 
governance, has perhaps put an end to the “end of history theories,” at-
tracting instead increasing attention to the institutional multiplicity of 
corporate-governance systems. 
As O’Kelley convincingly argued, Berle and Means’s book built on 
Veblen’s work in two important respects: it updated the consequences of 
absentee ownership, and it followed a similar evolutionary approach.101 
As to absentee ownership, Berle and Means clarified how management 
interests diverged from those of the predatory-profit motive of absent 
shareholders, which was Veblen’s most important concern.102 While 
managers could also follow a self-referential power-enhancing strategy, 
the road was open to demand the modern corporation serve not only the 
owners or the control but also those of the other stakeholders103—a point 
that has received increased attention in recent years.104 Moreover, Berle 
and Means built on Veblen’s (and Darwin’s) methodology, applying an 
evolutionary approach to the emergence of the modern corporation that is 
grounded on the notion of cumulative causal sequence.105 
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In both cases, the Berle–Veblen intellectual connections were ex-
tremely fruitful. Even now, their joint contributions offer a powerful al-
ternative to the history-silent neo-classical approach. But one must go 
beyond their evolutionary narrative, which focused mainly on the Ameri-
can corporation. Their Darwinian foundations must involve a multiplicity 
of evolutionary paths that, in the case of biology, give rise to a plurality 
of natural histories and species. The notion of cumulative casual se-
quences implies that initial conditions can have important consequences 
for the plurality of institutional paths and the possible divergence of their 
outcome. 
This Article has tried to follow this Darwinian insight, showing that 
democratic and aristocratic roots of corporate governance have had a 
major impact on the different institutional paths of Europe and the Unit-
ed States. Veblen’s mistrust of the goals of absentee owners and his ad-
miration for production engineers were somehow related to the demo-
cratic roots of the United States, which contributed to the evolution of 
the Berle and Means Public Company. The same dispersed ownership 
(and centralized managerial control) equilibrium did not evolve in Eu-
rope. In most cases involving the Old Continent, family dynasties re-
tained control of corporations with minority shareholding and in this way 
contributed to the generation of social-democratic reactions. 
The awareness of the multiplicity of these evolutionary paths is par-
ticularly important in the present crisis, which could put severe pressure 
on the survival of each one of these two species and generate important 
mutations. An open mind for alternative evolutionary paths is also im-
portant for understanding the new corporate species that are emerging in 
countries like India and China, which may soon have an economic 
weight that more appropriately represents their share of the world’s pop-
ulation. The Veblen–Berle–Means approach can be fruitfully applied to 
the rich biodiversity of organizations existing in the world economy. Its 
great analytical power should not be limited to the explanation of the 
evolution of the American corporation. 
                                                                                                             
causation from the negative feedback on which the standard theory of the convergence of market 
equilibrium rests. 
